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Vertical monopoly power, profit and risk: The British beer industry, c.1970-c.2004 
 
Abstract 
By investigating surplus and risk distribution in the British brewing industry, this paper 
shows that risk and risk transfer are important dimensions of vertical supply chain 
relationships. A comparative financial analysis shows the effects of models of vertical 
ownership before and after the break-up of producer controlled tenanted estates and the 
strategy and performance of pub-owning companies. Contrasting mechanisms for controlling 
the capture of surplus and division of risk are evaluated.  The paper complements prior 
studies that have concentrated on the brewers by assessing winners and losers amongst pub 
owning companies and tenants in different models of vertical organisation and how they 
might be effectively regulated.  
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Vertical monopoly power, profit and risk: The British beer industry, c.1970-c.2004 
 
1. Introduction 
The defining characteristic of the British beer industry has long been the vertical tie, whereby 
brewers restricted the choice of beer, and often a wider range of alcoholic and soft drinks, 
that the tenant was permitted to retail. The historical evolution of this tie has been well 
documented with particular emphasis being placed on the need for brewers to secure outlets 
for their beer.
1
 One feature of the tie, which has not received comparable attention, is the 
extent to which it affected the transfer of risk and the allocation of surplus between brewer 
and tenant.  By comparing the financial consequences of alternative tied arrangements, this 
paper evaluates the extent to which major regulatory changes were beneficial for key players 
in the value chain. 
The nature of surplus distribution and risk sharing in network governance, especially 
between first the brewer, and subsequently the pub-owning company (Pubco), and tenant, 
was a fundamental and long-established feature of the British brewing industry.  Comparing 
these systems of ownership, two similar but distinct models of vertical network governance 
can be identified.  The first, which prevailed until 1990, was the system of vertical control by 
large breweries over estates of tenanted or directly managed pubs. The managed house 
represents complete vertical integration and the manager is, in every respect, an employee of 
the brewer. A salaried manager runs the pub without incurring risks but also without sharing 
the profits. Hierarchical control and the power of fiat replace market based exchange and 
contracts and monitoring deal with residual moral hazard problems.
2
  
The power that was exercised by the breweries in this respect led to regulatory 
reviews in 1969, and again in 1989, which resulted in the Beer Orders. As a consequence, 
brewers were forced to divest significant portions of their tied estates.
3
 In turn, this led to the 
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 2 
rapid emergence of the second model of vertical ownership, based on the Pubco and a 
renewed consolidation of tenanted estates.
4
 These developments led to further questions 
about the market dominance of Pubcos, the fair treatment of tenants and, indeed, the 
sustainability of Pubcos.
5
 
In the second model, where tenants manage the pub, the licensee’s remuneration was 
based on a combination of property and beer margins (‘dry’ and ‘wet’ rents respectively). In 
terms of transaction cost economics (TCE), such arrangements were hybrids between the 
managed house and the free house, in which the landlord owned the property and assumed all 
the profits and risks of the enterprise. However, by its very nature, the advantages of this type 
cannot be described using a standard TCE approach.
6
  The hybrid form complicates issues of 
governance because it occupies the middle ground between market-based exchange and 
complete internalisation, in which, ‘business partners are neither friends nor strangers’.
7
  
Nonetheless, it has the potential to deliver numerous advantages: it reduces transaction costs 
(trust implies there is less opportunism) and encourages cooperation. Additionally, hybrids 
facilitate long-term relationships (short-term, market-based contracts, encourage 
opportunism), because they foster mutual flexibility in the use of resources by relevant 
parties.
8
 Where long term interdependencies and relational contracting occurs in hybrid 
contexts that are neither hierarchical nor purely market based, personal relationships, 
reputation and trust can also be important and counteract the purely cost driven motives that 
might otherwise underpin network governance.
9
 Insofar as these forms lower transaction 
costs and deliver surplus, the division of such surplus and associated business risk remains 
problematic in terms of specifying governance arrangements.  
As a consequence, the beer industry has the potential to illustrate the nature of such 
problems and attempts at solution. Moreover, vertically controlled organisation structures 
pose potential problems for regulators, particularly when monopoly power can be exercised 
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 3 
at key stages in the value chain. In the absence of integration, powerful operators can exercise 
dominance through direct contract specification motivated by cost minimisation.
10
 A specific 
aspect of the brewery tie and Pubco models that has not hitherto been investigated is the 
question of how much surplus or profit was generated under each regime and how the surplus 
and risk was distributed between the relevant parties, including the new financial 
stakeholders that entered the industry in the wake of the Beer Orders. In addressing these 
questions, the paper builds on previous histories of the British beer industry that have 
concentrated on the strategy and performance of the major brewers.
11
  
The paper complements previous research by considering for the first time the relative 
financial performance not just of Pubcos, but also of pubs themselves. Leaving the specifics 
of ownership temporarily aside, the British pub sector effectively consists of thousands of 
small businesses. To investigate the distribution of surplus and risk in vertical networks, the 
paper utilises pub level financial data to consider how these were shared in the pre and post 
Beer Orders models. For the purposes of assessing the relative profitability of brewers, 
Pubcos and pubs, the paper uses a variety of source material, including the financial 
accounting data of leading firms drawn from their annual accounts and statistical databases. It 
also draws on data from the major parliamentary enquiries of 1969, 1889 and 2004.
12
 The 
parameters of the study are set to include a sufficient window for the analysis of the pre-1989 
system and the subsequent model, ending in 2004 to include evidence from the Department 
of Trade and Industry (DTI) enquiry of that year, but to exclude the effects of the financial 
crisis that developed in 2007 and which had further substantial implications for the British 
pub industry and which are beyond the scope of the present enquiry. 
The paper is organised as follows.  Section 2 provides further elaboration of theories 
to establish the value of an analysis of surplus, risk and governance relationships within 
vertical networks. Section 3 provides an analysis of the emergence of the vertically integrated 
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 4 
tied house model and the effects of its replacement with the Pubco model after 1991. Section 
4 presents a case study of one Pubco, Enterprise Inns PLC (EIP), and the reasons for its 
emergence as the largest owner of pubs in the UK by the time of the 2004 DTI enquiry.  
Section 5 compares the financial performance of brewers in the periods before and after the 
Beer Orders. It also compares the performance of EIP with the rest of the industry.  Section 6 
analyses the financial performance of pub businesses under different contractual 
arrangements before and after the Beer Orders and examines the pattern of surplus and risk 
distribution within the value chain. Conclusions are presented in Section 7. 
 
2. Vertical organisation: Surplus, risk and governance  
Flexible structures have become more prevalent over recent decades, and have been the 
subject of significant research. Organisational theorists concerned with inter-firm 
relationships have tended to stress trust and commitment, whereas industrial economists and 
new institutional approaches highlight power and opportunism.
13
 As a consequence, there is a 
large literature on the potential advantages of inter-firm collaboration
14
 and how identity, 
path dependence and economies of specialisation might be combined with flexible and 
improvised organisational forms.
15
 Where there is increased uncertainty of customer demand, 
for example owing to obsolescence or seasonality, but also arising from social and regulatory 
changes, firms prefer vertical decoupling,
16
 thereby increasing the flexibility of the firm in 
conditions of uncertainty. At the same time, bilateral dependency leads to a lack of choice 
and increased risk of opportunism.
17
 Sharing human capital binds networks together and 
improves their performance, as does the product’s technical specification, thereby creating 
process improvements and product development opportunities.
18
 Managing network flows of 
resources and information involves developing co-ordination mechanisms that can be 
effectively governed, where governance involves inter alia mediating third parties that to 
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 5 
some degree are institutionalised.
19
  Such mediating institutions tend to be absent in UK and 
US models,
20
 leading to imbalances in the value chain that might result in market failure. 
  Such imbalances occur where activities in a supply chain are controlled from a 
‘vantage point’, normally the organisation in the network closest to the final transformation 
of the product before it reaches the consumer. A dominant organisation occupying the 
vantage point can critique its customers/suppliers and potentially help them develop, but such 
evaluations do not usually operate in reverse.
21
 Although several authors have stressed the 
importance of fairly sharing risks and benefits derived from joint effort between buyers and 
suppliers,
22
 and acknowledge that close relationships between a powerful buyer and its 
supplier firms create the opportunity to ‘systematically shift risk’ to the weaker side,
23
 there 
is still a lack of rigorous cross-industry empirical research on risk and benefit sharing within 
supply networks.
24
 In addition, where financial aspects are referred to, the emphasis, given 
the predominance of theoretical perspectives from institutional economics,  tends to be on 
transaction cost efficiencies. Risk, meanwhile, is specifically about supply risk and the 
counteracting effects of buffering.
25
 Financial risk and operating risk arising from the 
variability of a firm’s cash flows within the network, has not been incorporated into these 
conceptual models and taxonomies.  
However, it is clear that such risk might be avoided or imposed according to the 
power structure of the network. In turn this risk distribution depends on the specification of 
contracts in vertical and relational contexts. For example, a powerful network member might 
specify a contract to receive relatively stable cash flows at the expense of increasing the 
variability of cash flows for another, weaker, network member. Differing attitudes to risk are 
also important in principal-agent relationships, or where such relationships are supplanted by 
some degree of trust.
26
 Consequently, a risk-averse network member might benefit from 
network membership by surrendering some share of the surplus in return for another member 
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 6 
absorbing more of the risk.  
A further missing dimension of the analysis of vertical network governance, which 
has concentrated on the relationship between firms within the network, is the role of financial 
intermediaries and investors.
27
 Some research has considered the cooperative benefits of the 
venture capitalist relationship with entrepreneurs, and the issue of entrepreneurial 
opportunism,
28
 but there has been less attention given to the requirements of investors and 
their effects on parties at multiple layers of vertical organisations, or associated risk sharing 
arrangements. 
Where hybrid organisations can use these relational resources effectively, to create 
flexible structures that transcend industry boundaries, they can be an important source of 
competitive advantage.
29
 Where competitive advantage can be achieved, the role of network 
governance and the determinants of surplus distribution within the network remain of 
substantial importance. Where interdependence is high, and power is therefore more equally 
distributed, surplus is also shared more equally. On the other hand, concentrated power 
within a network, particularly at strategic points in the value chain, may lead to the 
appropriation of value by specific participants at the expense of other, weaker members. 
Where the focus shifts from networks that achieve competitive advantage to networks 
operating in declining industries, the forces leading to the allocation of surplus, and the 
associated distribution of risk can potentially intensify. As the rate of profit and accumulation 
has slowed in recent decades in core industries,
30
 increasing corporate indebtedness and the  
dominance of financial markets and ideologies, such as shareholder value maximisation,
31
 
suggest the importance of evaluating the role of financial intermediaries as part of the process 
of surplus and risk redistribution within vertical networks. The role of these intermediaries 
has been regarded as negative by some, for example leading to less investment in plant and 
equipment and increased short-termism,
32
 although further empirical evidence is needed, 
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 7 
particularly in relation to vertical networks. The British beer industry and the evolution of its 
vertical structure over several decades provide a unique opportunity to examine these 
relationships, and specifically to address the question: which method of vertical structure 
leads to improved performance of participants and how is the resulting surplus and risk 
allocated within the network to ensure long term stability and sustainability? 
 
3. The beer industry before and after the Beer Orders, 1989 
The rise of the tied and managed house systems 
The principal long standing feature of the vertical organisation of the British beer industry 
was the tied house system which was well established by the nineteenth century and 
continued to occupy a central role in the long-run evolution of the industry.
33
 It developed 
rapidly before 1914 as the brewery firms utilised stock market and bank finance to secure 
control of extensive property portfolios.
34
 In the inter war period, prompted by declining beer 
consumption,  the control of the larger brewers was consolidated through a series of mergers. 
Given the inherited pre-1914 structure of vertical integration, the only way brewers could 
maintain output with declining demand was to enlarge their market area by acquiring the 
licensed houses of other brewers via merger and acquisition.
35
 There were further merger 
waves in 1953–54, 1959– 61, 1968, 1972, and 1978–79. Rapid concentration, particularly in 
the 1959-61 wave led to the emergence of the ‘Big 6’ national brewers,
 36
 which following 
the abortive MC enquiry of 1969, controlled significant estates of pubs (Table 1). 
Subsequently, conglomerate mergers became a feature of the industry’s development. For 
example, the hotel chain Grand Metropolitan acquired the London brewers Truman, Hanbury 
& Buxton, in 1971, and Watney Mann, in 1972, while Allied Brewers acquired the food 
company J. Lyons & Co., in 1978.
37
  Nonetheless, as Table 1 shows, the concentration of 
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 8 
ownership of pubs by the ‘Big 6’, which emerged by 1970 was, for all practical purposes, that 
which confronted the Monopolies and Merger Commission (MMC) in 1989. 
 
Table 1 about here 
The tied arrangements, which evolved as a result of these transactions and institutional 
arrangements, had important impacts on the potential for unlocking scale and scope 
economies of the one hand, and for the evolved mechanisms of surplus and risk distribution 
between the network partners, on the other. They had several interacting components. The 
first of these was the ‘wet rent’, effectively the difference between the inflated ‘tied’ price of 
beer and the price that it could be purchased for in the market. The second was the ‘dry rent’, 
corresponding to the cost of renting the pub as a property, which included a benefit in kind 
element or nominal dry rent for associated domestic accommodation. The third was an 
element arising from managerial and other economies of scale that potentially provided the 
basis of co-operation in the vertical relationship. In today’s technical language of the 
industry, these are referred to as ‘special commercial or financial advantages’ (SCORFA), 
which include training, legal and professional support, business development managers, 
investment and centralised purchasing and technical services.
38
 The balance between dry and 
wet rent, which also included soft drinks and wines and spirits
39
 affected how the gross 
surplus generated from retail activities were shared between the tenant and the brewer. 
The alternative to tenancy arrangements was the ‘managed house’, where managers 
were salaried employees of the brewers. Tenanted and managed houses differed significantly 
in terms of the risk and return they offered to brewer and tenant/manager.  For example, the 
pay that a salaried manager received was independent of the earnings of the pub, and no dry 
rent was paid because this was part of the total remuneration package to the manager.  If the 
pub was highly successful, which tended to be the case with larger pubs with steady revenue, 
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 9 
all the profits were returned to the brewer. The brewer meanwhile was responsible for the 
upkeep of the house and improving its amenities. Tenancy and managed house beer retailing 
had one major advantage compared to the free trade:  greater control over quality at the point 
of sale.  Both systems also required the tenant or manager to retail the beers produced by their 
brewer-landlord.
40
 
For these reasons, between 1970 and 1990, a managerial hierarchical system prevailed 
in most of the industry. Investigations by the MMC reported that the ‘Big 6’, owned 52 per 
cent of the total pub stock in Britain and that the number of pubs owned by all brewers 
accounted for approximately 80 per cent of all British pubs meaning, therefore, that ‘free 
houses’ were very much in the minority.
41
 In addition, managed as opposed to tenanted 
houses became relatively more important. For example between 1971 and 1990, managed 
houses as a proportion of brewers’ ownership of all public houses increased from 25.4 to 31.2 
per cent, respectively.
42
 
The predominance of the managerial system also reflected the outcome of the 1969 
MC investigation into the monopoly structure of the industry. The investigation revealed, but 
failed to act on, a series of conflicts between landlord and tenant. From the tenants point of 
view these included restrictive practices in terms of the range of beers stocked and recent 
increases in dry rent without a corresponding reduction in wet rent.
43
 Unsurprisingly, the 
brewers viewed the tied-house system more positively, claiming that tied houses were in the 
public interest because this was the only system that enabled them to achieve economies in 
production and distribution. They further argued that it was reasonable that a tied-house 
should primarily sell the beers of the owning brewery since otherwise there would be no 
reason for the brewer to own pubs or to spend money on improving their amenities.
44
 One 
issue on which the brewers presented their strongest arguments concerned the nature of risk 
bearing and how this was affected by managed versus tenanted pubs.  Some brewers claimed 
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 10 
that managers were only installed in their most expensive houses, which would not be 
remunerative unless they obtained the wholesale and retail profits from these houses.  Often, 
these pubs were very large, with multiple bars, and therefore the personality of the licensee 
was much less important. Allied Lyons, for example, claimed that they intended to increase 
efficiency in their larger houses by introducing managers and ‘managerial systems’, which 
would be inappropriate for tenants. In the case of tenanted houses, the brewers claimed that 
they took a greater share of the risk than was appreciated and reiterated that their relationship 
with their tenants was a co-partnership and that tenants appreciated that risks were shared 
with brewers.
45
 Overall, the Commission agreed that the evidence did not suggest that 
tenants’ income was unduly low or, ‘that the division of income between tenant and brewer is 
unreasonable’.  The Commission acknowledged that even among tenants there were, ‘few 
strong expressions that the tie should be abolished’.
46
 
 
The Beer Orders 
Notwithstanding this evidence, by the 1980s, there were calls for a further MMC enquiry. 
Part of the explanation for renewed interest were investigations launched by various Price 
Commissions
47
 in the 1970s which indicated that the tied-house arrangement acted as a 
barrier to entry and, because it restricted tenants’ access to independent wholesalers, it 
hindered their ability to compete with managed houses.
48
 The landmark MMC Report of 
1989 was unequivocal in its attack on the tied-estate of the major brewers and its harmful 
effects on tenants: 
We have unanimously concluded that a monopoly exists in favour of 
those brewers who own tied houses or who have tying agreements 
with free houses in return for loans at favourable interest rates…We 
have confirmed our provisional finding that a complex monopoly 
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 11 
situation exists in favour of the brewers with tied estates and loan 
ties…tenants are unable to play a full part in meeting consumer 
preferences, both because of the tie and because the tenant’s 
bargaining position is so much weaker than his landlord’s…the 
complex monopoly has enabled brewers to keep tenants in a poor 
bargaining position.
49
  
Despite the efforts of the major brewers to negate these claims, the MMC 
recommended a number of provisions, including, inter alia: the requirement to divest half the 
number of pubs above the 2000 ceiling on the total number of on-licensed premises that 
could be owned by any brewing company, or group, which necessitated a total divestment of 
22,000 houses; the complete abolition of loan ties; that to improve the competitiveness of 
tenants in the tied-trade, they should be permitted to purchase a minimum of one draught beer 
from independent suppliers, and that brewers should publish wholesale price lists for the on-
licensed trade which document the discounts available.
50
 These recommendations were 
subsequently enshrined in the Beer Orders of 1989.
51
 
There can be no doubt that following the Beer Orders there was a pronounced 
structural change in the ownership of pubs and full on-licenses which are set out in Table 1., 
Because the MMC concentrated on eradicating vertical integration between brewing and pub 
retailing, the tie itself was retained, so that the key transformation was the rise of the Pubco 
and the demise of the brewery-owned estate. Thus, the ‘Big 6’ national brewers, such as 
Bass, Allied, and Whitbread, who had previously dominated pub ownership, were replaced 
by Pubcos that were primarily only engaged in the retailing of beer, largely eradicating the 
strong vertical ties which had existed between brewers and their pubs.
52
 The exceptions to 
this were the regional brewers Greene King, Mitchell & Butler, and Wolverhampton & 
Dudley who continued with a tied-estate, albeit on a much smaller scale than the nationals.   
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 12 
Nonetheless, like the ‘Big 6’ before them, the Pubcos continued to use beer ties.   
Enterprise Inns Ltd, Innspired, and Punch Taverns, all retained variants of the ‘full-tie’ 
model, in which the tenant was required to purchase all alcoholic drinks (beers, lagers, wines, 
spirits) from the brewer.  The last two companies admitted that their tenants were tied only to 
buying beer, lager, cider and soft drinks and were free to purchase spirits, wines, cigarettes 
and food from independent sources. Enterprise reported that it imposed a range of exclusive 
purchasing obligations ranging from a full-drinks tie ‘all alcoholic and soft drinks’ to a partial 
tie, which only applied to beer.
53
  
However, the extent to which tenants legitimately purchased drinks outside the tie has 
been questioned.  Some tenants operated as if they were subject to a ‘full tie’ because they 
feared the imposition of sanctions such as higher rent or reduced monies for repairs.
54
 
Exacerbating matters, decisions reached in the European Court of Justice on the anti-
competitive effects of vertical ties (sometimes referred to as ‘quantity forcing’) could be 
permitted. Thus, in Roberts v. Commission, involving Greene King, it was accepted that an 
exclusive purchase agreement with a brewer possessing a very small market share was unable 
to contribute significantly to market foreclosure.  Whitbread faced similar challenges.  In this 
case, the use of a ‘tie’ did prevent competition, but the benefits from having the tie exceeded 
any negative effects and Whitbread were granted an exemption.  Finally, in the mid-1990s, 
following Foster’s decision to sell its UK brewing interests to Courage (Scottish & 
Newcastle), the Pubco Inntrepreneur Estates Ltd (IEL) had no alternative but to buy its beer 
from Courage because Fosters still retained 50 per cent ownership of IEL.
55
  
The longitudinal stages of Pubco development can be summarised as follows. Stage 
one, immediately following the Beer Orders, witnessed the emergence of the Pubco, typically 
organised through a management buy-out and backed by a venture capital fund.
56
 During this 
stage the new Pubcos expanded primarily through acquisitions of ‘parcels’ of pub estates.
57
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The second phase began around 1995 with a series of initial public offerings in the shares of 
Pubcos.
58
 These transactions provided a potential exit for the original investors,
59
 although 
the general effect through institutional placings was to consolidate control through specialist 
private equity firms or venture capital arms of major international banks.
60
 Ownership by 
financial institutions through stock market listings provided the opportunity for a wave of 
takeovers and mergers in the Pubco sector. Consequently, the surviving Pubcos were able to 
build up large estates of tied houses (Table 1).  
The creation of these estates, with predictable cash flows arising from the terms of 
Pubco leasing arrangements, led to the third phase, which occurred in the mid to late 1990s, 
and  was characterized by the securitisation of Pubco debt by the banks.
61
 In effect this meant 
that new bonds, typically with high coupon rates, could be issued against the cash generation 
potential of pub income streams.
62
 These profits were based on controlled margins, since the 
Pubco determined the transfer price of beer to the pub and therefore the debt could be issued 
safely if cash based earnings exceeded the required interest payments.
63
 Although different 
firms passed through different stages at different times, the general characteristics of the life 
cycle were strikingly similar:  a management buyout supported by venture capital resulting in 
rapid growth, leading to estate consolidation, concentration of buyer power and financial re-
engineering of ownership claims.  
 The combined effect of such structural and financing changes was to create 
continuous pressure on the Pubcos to expand their estates. Acquisitions of new estates created 
opportunities to boost earnings in line with market expectations, partly because there were 
economies of scale associated with the increased buyer power. The Beer Orders led to 
concentration in the supply chain, with some firms exiting brewing, closing breweries and 
consolidating the remainder.
64
  Pubcos negotiated discounts with suppliers resulting in 
declining wholesale margins, whilst competition for estate contracts increased.
65
 A further 
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opportunity set arose from portfolio management of outlets such that poorly performing pubs 
could be closed down in favour of investment in typically larger, better performing pubs.  
These trends were potentially good news for the profits of Pubcos and their financial backers.  
Meanwhile in 2000 the Office of Fair Trading (OFT) completed a follow-up report on 
the industry, which recommended that most of the Articles of the Beer Orders could be 
rescinded, as none of the big six brewers had kept estates that were anywhere near the 2,000 
ceiling. The Orders were revoked in 2003 on the grounds that the restructuring of the pub 
trade left no one to whom the Orders were relevant.
66
 The increased market power of Pubcos 
nonetheless led to a new wave of parliamentary scrutiny, and an investigation by the DTI in 
2004.
67
 Despite the emergence and growth of the Pubcos, by 2004, the ten biggest of these 
companies shown in Table 1, owned nearly 6000 fewer pubs than those operated by the ‘Big 
6’ at the time of the Beer orders.  Even so, by 2003-04, Pubcos owned a large majority of UK 
pubs, with the two largest, EIP and Punch, owning 58.6 per cent of UK pubs.
68
 Ironically, 
these two pub companies had greater market share than under the ‘complex monopoly’ 
broken up by the Beer Orders, when the two largest firms controlled 40.7 per cent of pubs.
69
   
As a consequence of this new market dominance, the Federation of Small Businesses 
(FSB) asked the OFT to investigate the market for the resale of beer through tied public 
houses in 2002. The concerns expressed by the FSB expressed were: tied tenants paid too 
much for their beer; they paid too much rent and did not receive adequate support from their 
Pubcos, especially when levels of trade fell below expectations; and the beer tie itself 
restricted choice. Many of these concerns were raised in previous MMC investigations but, in 
the early years of the new millennium, they had added poignancy because significant 
monopoly power remained in the industry. For example, in production, whereas in 1989 the 
‘big six’ controlled 75 per cent of beer production, by 2004, just four brewers accounted for 
76 per cent. In addition, surveys of tenants under the new regime revealed considerable 
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dissatisfaction.  A survey conducted in 2004, revealed that 45 per cent of tenants responding 
said that they would ‘probably not’ or ‘definitely not’ take out another lease with their 
landlord. The relevant figures for EIP and Punch were worse, being 60 and 61 per cent, 
respectively.  In addition, tenants of EIP and Punch had a low opinion of the fairness of their 
landlord as business partner, with 55 per cent assessing their degree of fairness as ‘poor’ or 
‘very poor’.
70
 Why, then, did the post beer order model generate these criticisms and lead to 
further regulatory investigation? 
 
4. Enterprise Inns 
As the largest Pubco, EIP’s history exemplifies the pattern of Pubco development sketched in 
the previous section and whose business model provides a useful opportunity to assess the 
processes of value capture and risk transfer within tenanted arrangements. The firm grew 
rapidly through acquisition of new estate, which is detailed in Table 2. The firm originated in 
1991 when, following the Beer Orders, Bass Plc divested Enterprise Inns to a venture capital 
syndicate backed management buy-in led by Ted Tuppen.
71
 The company began with 370 
pubs, increasing these to 500 by the time it was floated in 1995. Tuppen based EIPs strategy 
on the provision of buying power and expertise to assist pub mangers.
72
 EIPs financial 
strategy was based on rapid growth through acquisition financed mainly by debt, but 
underpinned by strong asset backing from a property estate that was rising in value and that 
could generate cash through selective disposals.  
 
Table 2 about here 
Following flotation, EIP’s acquisitive activities intensified. It acquired 12 pubs from 
the Greenalls Group PLC, 39 pubs from Whitbread PLC and disposed of 14 under-
performing pubs. In July 1996 it acquired John Labatt (UK) Limited and its estate of 413 
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pubs from Interbrew SA for a total consideration, including the assumption of associated 
debt, of £62 million. The deal was financed by a £9m share issue with the balance from bank 
loans.
73
 In May 1997 it acquired Discovery Inns plc and its estate of 277 pubs for a total 
consideration, including the assumption of associated debt (£26.7m), of £46.2 million taking 
its total estate to 1200 pubs. The Discovery acquisition was partly funded by a rights issue of 
£33.2m.
74
 
By these methods, Tuppen’s strategy in the late 1990s was to acquire a sustainable 
estate of 1600 pubs.  He achieved the target with a £48m cash bid for Gibbs Mew (GM) plc 
and its estate of 310 pubs in February 1998. The GM acquisition exemplified EIP’s wider 
strategy of taking over struggling firms, which as a consequence of poor estates and/or 
excessive debt had a poor financial track record, and meant that EIP could purchase the 
company for under book value and sell off its brewery, drinks wholesaling business and 30 of 
its worst performing pubs.
75
 In March 1999 after soliciting support from institutional 
shareholders, including Norwich Union, EIP secured control of Century Inns plc and its 
estate of 498 pubs with a £79.1m bid and a total consideration, including the assumption of 
associated debt, of £139.0 million. Century had floated at the same time as EIP, but Century’s 
managed house business model achieved less financial success than EIP’s tenancy based 
approach.
76
 These and other successful acquisitions took the EIP estate to around 9000 pubs 
by December 2004.
77
  
EIP progressively withdrew its dependence on the distribution and administrative 
systems of brewers and ended its relationship with Bass. Meanwhile it used subcontracting to 
achieve control over its supply chain through an agreement with S&N, which subcontracted 
its entire supply chain to Scottish Courage.
78
 In June 1999 EIP signed supply contracts with 
Scottish and Newcastle, centralising its warehousing and distribution activities.
79
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In common with the wider sector, these deals were orchestrated by the private equity 
industry, which generated large returns on from deals involving pub estates. In June 2001 
EIP’s acquisition of an estate of 439 pubs from Morgan Grenfell Private Equity for a total 
cash consideration of £266.7 million was financed using a facility provided by its parent, 
Deutsche Bank. A further acquisition in the following month of an estate of 431 pubs from 
S&N for a total cash consideration of £269.5 million was financed by a £66m rights issue and 
backed by HSBC and Deutsche Bank.
80
 Deals were increasingly characterised by 
sophisticated financial engineering. In March 2002 EIP took a 16.8% stake in Newco, a 
special purpose vehicle set up by the private equity boutique, Cinven, led by Morgan 
Stanley's Princes Gate Investors and Legal & General Ventures. Its purpose was to acquire 
the Unique Pub Company (UPC) and Voyager Pub Group from Nomura International, 
valuing the total enterprise at £2.013bn. EIP’s investment cost £75m and included a call 
option to purchase the remainder of the equity two years later at a fixed price of £608m. 
Securitised loans were sold in the newly merged UPC entity, which raised £855m. Cinven 
returned over twice the originally invested capital.
81
 In May 2002 EIP raised a £1.28bn 
syndicated acquisition loan and announced a bid for the estate of 1,860 pubs of Laurel Pub 
Group Limited from MGPE for a total cash consideration of £881 million. As part of the deal 
it promised to sell 60 of its pubs to avoid a review by the Competition Commission.
82
 By 
2004, then, EIP had achieved rapid growth funded mainly through expensive debt. As a 
consequence, it now had the largest estate of pubs in the UK.  
 
5. Comparative financial performance 
From the above discussion, several issues are worthy of further investigation. The first is 
whether or not the Beer Orders impacted on industry profits. If the regulation succeeded in 
breaking up a complex monopoly, then the average rate of profit in the industry should have 
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declined. Second, the above evidence on the emergence of the Pubco suggests that the 
incorporation of new methods of financial control and flexibility into vertical network 
arrangements could be a business model that provided the basis of competitive advantage, at 
least before the financial crisis of 2007-2008. To assess this proposition, the performance of 
EIP and other features of its financial model are compared to industry benchmarks.
83
 
 
Figure 1 about here
 
 
 To illustrate the first issue, Figure 1 shows comparative returns on capital employed 
(ROCE) for samples of firms before and after the Beer Orders. The evidence in Figure 1 
suggests that there was indeed a significant decline in average profit after the Beer Orders, 
which appear to represent an important structural break. Average profits before the Beer 
Orders were 12.9% and followed no particular trend, although the onset of long-term decline 
is perceptible from the early 1980s. Other factors influencing the trend included the recession 
of  1990-1991 and the rapid growth of imported beers for home consumption, spurred by the 
exit from the ERM in 1992.
84
 Price increases accentuated this trend, with on sale prices 
reaching an index level of 173.4 by 1996 (Jan 1988 = 100), compared to an equivalent of 
140.6 for off sales. However, there was an even more dramatic divergence in the early 2000s, 
when the price index of off sales fell from 157.8 in 2001 to 149.9 in 2004, compared to an 
increase for on sales from 212.1 to 231.1 in the same period.
85
 Changes to accounting rules 
may also have impacted on specific business valuations, although without having substantial 
impact on the general trends across our whole sample.
86
 These wider trends only partly 
explain the decline of pub profitability, and the Beer Orders accentuated this decline, such 
that in the subsequent period profits have averaged only 6.7%. Even in the 10 years prior to 
the Beer Orders, when profits were below their long run level, they nonetheless averaged 
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11.5%. The evidence strongly suggests that the effect of breaking the vertical tie was to 
reduce the profitability of the industry.  
 To examine the relative performance of Britain’s most rapidly growing Pubco, Figure 
2 compares the performance of EIP to the industry average. As Figure 2 shows, EIP indeed 
outperformed its competitors. The average return on capital for EIP for the period 1996-2004 
was 8.8% compared to 6.8% for the rest of the industry. However, it is also notable that, 
despite its industry dominance, EIP’s performance did not achieve the same level of success 
achieved by the vertical brewers prior to the Beer Orders. Moreover, as the above discussion 
has suggested, much of EIP’s success was attributable to buying and selling estate, as 
opposed to running the core business of vending beer. In the period 1996 to 2004, asset 
disposals generated 50.0 per cent of the cash from operating activities.
87
  
 
 
Figure 2 about here 
 
Figure 3 about here 
 
Figure 4 about here 
 
A further interesting feature of EIP’s underlying financial returns was their stability in 
comparison to the rest of the industry. Returns to equity investors outstripped underlying 
returns during this period, averaging 12.4%.
88
 The additional return of around 3.5% was 
generated by EIPs financial structure and specifically its extensive use of debt finance. Figure 
3 shows the ratio of debt to equity for EIP compared to the rest of the sector.  As the figure 
illustrates, the industry as a whole generally financed just over 50% of its investment using 
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debt finance. Throughout the period EIP used a consistently higher ratio and for most of the 
time this was very high. As a consequence a high proportion of the cash flow generated from 
the estate was used to service interest payments.
89
 Even so, the financial model delivered 
spectacular returns to investors. Rapid growth of the estate, combined with refinancing deals, 
for example the Civen case, and the contribution from property price inflation and estate 
disposals to profits have been noted above and their combined effect was to generate 
spectacular returns for shareholders. These are shown in Figure 4. During the period 
November 1995 to December 2004 EIP shareholder return outperformed the return on the 
London all share index by a very significant margin. Declining interest rates combined with 
high leverage boosted these returns.
90
 During this period the annual equivalent return on EIP 
shares was 39.5% compared to 7.1% return on the index. In the same period sales turnover 
grew by an equivalent 44.2% and earning per share by 31.9% per annum.
91
 
In summary, although underlying accounting returns were ahead of the industry 
average, they were nonetheless low in relative terms and were boosted from the shareholder 
point of view by increased leverage. The EIP evidence suggests that the Pubco model 
involved transferring risk to equity holders through borrowing. If the model worked, the 
Pubco could arbitrage the returns from its estate using cheaper debt finance, which could be 
boosted by capital profits from deals in the pub estate. The strategy was also dangerous one, 
particularly if underlying returns from the estate fell below the interest rate on securitised and 
other loans.
 92
 A second and important element of the strategy was therefore to ensure that 
pub income streams were at a sufficient level and, where possible to offload risk to the tenant. 
The next section investigates how surplus and risk was shared between stakeholder groups in 
the vertical network in each of the main contractual circumstances discussed above.  
 
6. Tenancy arrangements: pub level profits and risk  
Page 21 of 52
URL: http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/fbsh
Business History
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review Only
 21 
There is relatively little prior literature on business performance at pub level. These 
businesses are either small, private, independently controlled units, or part of larger centrally 
administered estates. Consequently, there is a paucity of publicly available data. The MMC 
report of 1989 and the 2004 Trade and Industry Select Committee on Pubcos are therefore 
important sources of evidence, which offer the opportunity to conduct pub-level analyses of 
vertical relationships. 
Debates about rents and the contradictory evidence furnished to regulatory and 
legislative authorities suggest the value of further empirical investigation.
 93
 The Pubco model 
is investigated first because in managing its relations with tenants it developed new 
combinations of dry/wet rent, which the tenant could choose according to their degree of risk 
aversion.
94
 These have important implications for measuring the division of  surplus and risk 
transfer in the value chain and allow a suitable test of the equity of risk transfer. Once this 
comparison is established, further comparisons can be undertaken with typical pre 1989 
arrangements. 
To assess the claims and counter claims of excessive rent and the allocation of risk 
and reward between brewer/Pubco and tenant, Table 3 compares pub level financial results 
according to varying contracts and trading conditions. The table is based on the four different 
contractual scenarios set out by EIP to illustrate how tenants could be offered the same net 
profit but with variations in dry and wet rent and machine income. For simplicity, contracts 
based on machine income sharing (scenarios (1) and (3)) are ignored.
95
 Model (1) sets out the 
financial position of a free house, which is used as a base case.
96
 Models (2) and (3) are 
elaborations of two of the four scenarios given in evidence by EIP to the 2004 TIC enquiry. 
In (2) the tenant pays a higher wet rent and compensating lower dry rent, with the effect that 
cost of sales (ie the direct cost) is proportionately higher in (2) compared to (3), which is a 
low wet rent, high dry rent, scenario. Dry rent is correspondingly higher in (3). In (2) and (3) 
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the expected average profit to the licensee is the same and the differences reflect only the 
contractual arrangements. The important difference is the risk and, implicitly, how the Pubco 
determined its price.  
 
Table 3 about here 
 
Table 3 compares the rates of profit under the three models. As the data show, free 
houses are more profitable than the tenancy options. The net return (profit after interest and 
rent respectively) is over three percentage points higher for the free house than the tenancy, 
regardless of the specific arrangement in (2) and (3). Morgan Stanley’s investigation revealed 
similar yields from the point of view of the pub landlord and concluded that such returns 
offered the prospect of a reasonable standard of living.
97
 Even so, witnesses to the DTI 
enquiry suggested that most of the surplus was being taken by the Pubco at the expense of the 
tenant.
98
 
Table 3 also computes the risk to the owner/tenant arising from leverage effects. The 
leverage is financial, arising from fixed interest charges, in the case of the free house and 
arising from fixed rent in the case of tenancies in (2) and (3). In both cases the leverage co-
efficient can be interpreted as a measure of risk associated with the type of ownership. In the 
free house scenario, the interest rate on the pub value is used as a proxy for the opportunity 
cost of the investment. The consequence of leverage is that the required rate of return, or cost 
of capital rises to accommodate the associated risk.  
Computing risk in this fashion is useful because an important difference between (2) 
and (3) is the risk taken on by the tenant. In (3) the tenant has more risk because the high dry 
rent represents a fixed cost, which must be covered regardless of trading conditions, leading 
to greater variability in residual returns. The effect of transferring to a lower dry rent contract, 
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as in (2) is to transform some of the fixed cost into variable cost, such that in effect the Pubco 
provides some insurance to the more risk-averse pub landlord. Table 3 quantifies the 
insurance value of the wet rent contract.  First it determines whether the risk transfer from the 
Pubco to the tenant is fairly priced.
99
 If a pub landlord is considering changing from (2) to 
(3), the beer will become cheaper, and the extent of the reduction, in a fair contract will be 
proportionate to the increase in risk. In other words the cost of sales should fall to the amount 
required to secure the rate of return that corresponds to that level of risk. Reflecting this, the 
cost of capital is 17% higher in (3) compared to (2) (10.887% and 9.263% respectively), but 
the expected residual profit rate for the tenant remains unaltered. In view of the increased 
risk, other things being equal, the residual rate of profit would also need to rise by 17% such 
that the profit to the licensee would be £45,600 instead of £38,800, an increase of £6,800. 
Instead of offering the landlord a wet rent reduction of £18,000 through beer discounts (the 
difference between (2) and (3) cost of sales in Table 3, the Pubco would have to offer 
£24,800 (ie £18,000 plus the increase in required profit of £6,800) to induce a risk neutral 
landlord to shift to a type (3) contract. On EIP’s own evidence and figures, the tenants were 
not being fairly compensated for extra risk implied by high dry rent contracts. In similar vein, 
although some risk could be avoided by moving from (3) to (2) the loss of discount would 
disproportionately reduce the gross return on capital. 
Those seeking regulatory intervention against Pubco rent policies did not address this 
issue in the evidence given before the Trade and Industry Committee investigating Pubcos in 
2004-2005. Instead they relied on the testimony of individual licensees. Linda Newport, an 
EIP licensee of the Brasenose Arms in North Oxfordshire, provided a detailed and critical 
account of the effects of her Pubco contract. She stated that she worked 90 hours per week, 
earning £200, and that rents were increased by 40% on renegotiation to a 21-year lease, 
which was subject to further RPI increases each year. Landlords spent substantial amounts on 
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improving their property, only to face rent increases.
100
 Newport claimed that rents were 
high, although her evidence was ambiguous.
101
 These charges led landlords to sell their 
leaseholds.
102
 Considering the accounting evidence that Newport provided to the Committee 
and comparing it with the ‘average’ pub detailed in the EIP annual report and accounts and 
the information provided by EIP to the committee, there were some wide discrepancies. Rent 
charges for the Brasenose were comparable to pubs of similar size in the EIP estate, but the 
sales turnover was around 9% below average and the gross (pre-rent) profit nearly 50% 
below average.
103
 The evidence available to the committee suggests that the problems were 
with this atypical business rather than the EIP rent collection model per se.  
 Tuppen meanwhile defended the EIP model when subsequently giving evidence to the 
same committee. He suggested that EIP licensees were partners and the partnership was built 
on mutual advantages arising from the tie and the rent models available to tenants.
 104
 Tuppen 
questioned Newport’s evidence, pointing out her refusal to allow EIP staff to access her 
accounts for the purposes of assessing her request for a rent review.
 
At the same time he 
conceded that EIP would not disclose the prices it paid for the beer supplied to tenants and 
prospective tenants.
105
   
Subsequently at a committee hearing in 2009 on the same subject, he suggested that 
an important advantage of the tied system was that it balanced ‘the fixed costs and the 
variable risks and rewards between the pub company and the licensee’.
106
 As far as EIP was 
concerned it offered the opportunity for rent reviews with the possibility of rent reductions 
and offered a programme of direct financial assistance to struggling licensees.
107
 
Notwithstanding such supportive aspects of EIP policies, lack of disclosure, the use of fiat in 
rent adjustments and the formalisation of the review process were indicative of a lack of trust 
between the two parties which, when relationships were difficult --  as in the Brasenose case -
- tended to escalate transaction costs.  
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As the above discussion has demonstrated, many features of the pre 1989 beer tie 
were reproduced in the Pubco business model. To assess the similarities and differences in 
the application of vertical relationships, and the effects on pub level profitability, Table 4 
compares the three scenarios in Table 3 with three further scenarios using 1986 data. These 
are a free house 1986 (4), a 1986 managed house (5) and an adjusted scenario in (6). Model 
(6) shows the profit that would have accrued to the pub without the effects of inflated transfer 
prices from the brewer. The figures in Table 4 suggest that tied houses were performing 
marginally worse in 2004 compared to 1986 and that free houses were performing much 
better in 2004.  The improvement of free house performance reflects lower interest rates but 
was mainly the result of improved gross margins. Models (3) and (5) show comparable gross 
margins suggesting some gain for the Pubco at the expense of the tenant in (3) due to the 
specification of the contract. The model in (6) is similar to the results for the 2004 free house, 
which factoring changes in property values suggest that the 2004 free house corresponds to 
the effect of removing the tie in 1989 in terms of transferring profit from the brewer to the 
tenant. 
Table 4 about here 
 
The evidence above suggests that Pubcos were able to exert some financial pressure 
on their tenants, but that the 2004 Pubco model was not radically different from the division 
of profit in the 1986 pre Beer Orders model. Thus far the 2004 data has relied on EIP and it is 
useful to assess how representative EIP was. Table 5 compares the EIP high wet rent scenario 
(Table 3, model [2]) shown here as model (1) with Wolverhampton and Dudley (2) and a 
shadow profit and loss account for an average pub calculated from data supplied by Morgan 
Stanley (3). 
Table 5 about here 
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The outstanding feature of Table 5 is the similarity of the three scenarios. All have very 
similar gross and net returns on capital. It is perhaps not surprising as the Morgan Stanley 
data was taken from EIP and Punch Taverns. The Wolverhampton and Dudley memorandum 
noted that the ‘pub estates are managed in a similar way to the Pubcos’.
108
 In line with the 
comparison earlier, the profit of Linda Newport’s pub was very low when compared to the 
alternative cases in Table 3. Using the figures given in her evidence suggests the equivalent 
profit before appropriations figure was around £37,000, which was substantially below all 
comparable scenarios in Table 4.
109
 Newport’s evidence suggested that her profits were 
below average, and that many tenants were experiencing financial difficulties. Tenants, many 
of whom believed they were entering into a cooperative and mutually beneficial relationship 
with the Pubcos felt badly let down, and in some cases were traumatised by the treatment 
they subsequently received.
110
 Although this evidence could be questioned for a number of 
reasons, the case demonstrated a lack of trust between the parties, and from the tenant’s point 
of view, escalating transaction cost associated with compliance with Pubco procedures. 
 
7. Conclusions 
The purpose of the above analysis was to demonstrate that the distribution of power within 
vertical networks has an important impact on the division of surplus between network 
participants and, by way of addition to prior literature, the corresponding division of risk. The 
evidence suggests that after the Beer Orders, the Pubcos maintained the profit margins 
available to tenants under the previous system, but transferred onto them a disproportionate 
level of risk. As the above analysis shows, tenants had typically taken on more risk without 
compensatory higher margins, or risk-averse tenants had obtained only low margins. At the 
same time, trust, which is a defining characteristic of ‘hybrid’ forms of organisation, did not 
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feature in the Pubco-tenant relationship, which was characterised by opacity and fiat in the 
determination of wet and dry rents. Typical margins for tenants in 2004 were comparable to 
those earned in similar arrangements in 1986. Indeed low margins seemed to persist at similar 
levels in all models of pub ownership. The exception was the free house, which performed 
better in 2004 conditions by comparison to those prevailing in the period of the beer tie and 
the dominance of the big 6. Tenants’ risk aversion was natural in an increasingly volatile and 
competitive trading environment, providing the Pubcos with the opportunity to use the 
wet/dry rent system to specify asymmetric contracts for their tenants. 
Regulation then has assisted some pub owners by freeing the supply of beer but has 
not succeeded in preventing large and powerful companies controlling key stages of the value 
chain. Notwithstanding their rapid growth and apparent market power, Pubcos were less 
profitable in the post beer orders period than the large monopoly brewers before 1989. 
Moreover much of their growth has come from debt-financed acquisition creating significant 
cash flows from subsequent disposals and the securitisation of the remainder. Financial 
intermediaries were significant beneficiaries of this process, which generated some 
spectacular returns to shareholders, entering the industry in the 1990s and building up 
substantial ownership positions prior to the financial crisis of 2007. Notwithstanding these 
transformations, they have failed to halt the long run decline of the industry, and regulation 
has failed to protect either tenants or consumers.  
The above analysis of the beer industry, and in particular the Pubco model of vertical 
ownership, has provided some useful insights into the processes of distributing surplus and 
risk within the network. In particular, powerful operators within vertical networks not only 
control the financial returns of weaker members explicitly through contractual relationships, 
but can also implicitly control risk arising from variation in underlying cash flows such that it 
is borne disproportionately to the level of expected return. Whilst Pubcos and indeed their 
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shareholders benefited from such arrangements, tenants in particular have suffered declining 
fortunes, or at least can only earn returns similar to historic norms by taking on 
disproportionate risk from the Pubco.  
Research that has explored the power dynamics in other vertical networks, for example 
food retailing, might usefully be complemented by new approaches considering the extent to 
which such disproportionate risk transfer occurs. Incorporating this new element, the unequal 
distribution of power within vertical networks becomes all the more problematic for 
regulators. As the experience of the British beer industry post the Beer Orders demonstrates, 
regulation is indeed difficult, and in the face of declining margins and pub closures, all the 
more urgent. 
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such as Greenall Whitley, Daniel Thwaites and Tollemarch & Cobbold, agreed to ‘swap’ 
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completed. Spicer, et al., Interv ntion, 22-24. 
48
 Spicer et al., Intervention: 9-26. In addition, secret lobbying by Guinness to the Office of 
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49
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50
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51
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52
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61473.  By 2004, the figure was slightly under 60,000, and by 2009, it was approximately 
52,495.  Spicer, et al., Intervention: 189. 
53
  TISC, Pub Companies, QQ.144; 175, 237.    
54
  Spicer et al, Intervention, 77. 
Page 33 of 52
URL: http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/fbsh
Business History
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review Only
 33 
                                                                                                                                                  
55
  Many of these decisions were based on Delimitis v. Henninger Bräu Ag (1991) and raised 
the question of whether beer ties violated Article 81 of the EC Treaty, which outlawed 
activities constraining competition. Judgment of 5 July 2001, Case T-25/99 Colin Arthur 
Roberts and Valerie Ann Roberts v. Commission [2001] ECR II-1881; Whitbread plc v. 
Timothy John Falla 5 Eur L. Rep 150 (2001); Annex to the Decision of the Commission to 
reject the complaint in Case No IV/34.907/F3. 
56
 For example Enterprise Inns was a spin out from Bass backed by a venture capital 
consortium. Sunday Times 17th September, 1995; Daily Telegraph, 7th February, 2014. 
57
 By 1995 the six largest Pubcos (owning between 215 and 500 pubs) were: Ascot Holdings; 
Enterprise Inns; Century Inns; Innkeeper Group; Sycamore Inns; Ushers. TISC, UK policy on 
monopolies, Q.72. 
58
 For example in February 1996 the Famous Pub Company was floated with market value of 
£2.3m, placed to city firms; Investors Chronicle, 12
th
 January, 1996.  
59
  For example, Discovery Inns, backed by Kleinwort Benson (KB), although a financially 
successful Pubco with strong earnings growth pulled a flotation in favour of a sale to 
Enterprise Inns. The motive was to provide an exit for KB; Independent, 2
nd
 March, 1997. 
60
 New investors included Nomura (Grand Pub Co.) Daiwa (Avebury Taverns) and BT 
Capital Partners (Grovebase, which acquired a large chunk of the former Bass estate).  
Investors Chronicle, 2
nd
 January, 1998, 16
th
 January, 1998. Deutsche Bank (MGPE) paid 
£1.62bn for the Whitbread pubs business including the tenanted estate and the Hogshead 
chain, renamed the Laurel Pub Company. Deutsche Bank subsequently divested MGPE to 
MidOcean Partners, which put Laurel up for sale in early 2004 following poor financial 
results. Times, 26
th
 November 2004; Private Equity Asia, 14
th
 September, 2004. 
61
 For example Nomura issued the Phoenix Inns Ltd bond, yielding 9 per cent and listed in 
Luxembourg, initially for two years, subsequently extended to 12. Meanwhile, it disposed of 
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many Phoenix pubs, including 850 to Grovebase, realising significant capital gains. Investors 
Chronicle, 2
nd
 January, 1998. On the emergence of the market in collateralised rental streams, 
see Bower, ‘Competition policy and the legitimacy of finance’, 12.  
62
 Nomura issued the Unique Pub Finance Plc securitization in March 1999 for £810 million, 
with a tap issuance of £335 million in February 2001. With the tap, 677 pubs were added to 
the original 2,614 pubs. Some of these are piecemeal acquisitions, but many are houses that 
could not be securitized earlier. A second tap was made in September 2002, incorporating 
888 new pubs into the transaction. Further issues are subject to ratings agency approval to 
prevent dilution. Vink and Thibeault, “An Empirical Analysis Of Asset-Backed 
Securitization”. 
63
 Where cash based earnings are measured using Earnings before Interest, Depreciation and 
Amortisation (EBITDA). 
64
 By 1994 the large brewing firms had closed 14 breweries. TISC, UK policy on monopolies. 
Q.72. 
65
 Competition Commission, Interbrew SA and Bass Plc, 92. 
66
 Office of Fair Trading, The Supply of Beer OFT 317, December 2000; The Supply of Beer 
(Tied Estate)(Revocation) Order 2002, SI 2002/3204 and The Supply of Beer (Loan Ties, 
Licensed Premises and Wholesale Prices)(Revocation) Order 2003, SI 2003/52. On the 
Government’s case for abolishing the Beer Orders see, Fourth Standing Committee on 
Delegated Legislation, 11 December 2002, c 5, cc10-11.  
67
 TISC Pub Companies. 
68
 TISC, Pub Companies, Q.123 and Q.2 and table 1. 
69
 Calculated from Table 1. See also TISC, Pub Companies, Q.11. 
70
 Spicer et al., Intervention,  211; TISC, Pub Companies, 128-II, Oral and Written Evidence, 
Appendix 12, paras. 8.4-8.12. 
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71
 Graham Edward Tuppen, 1952- Chief Executive Enterprise Inns, 1991-2014. The venture 
capital consortium was led by National Westminster. Sunday Times 17
th
 September, 1995; 
Daily Telegraph, 7
th
 February, 2014. EIP was originally set up as a management consortium 
led by Michael Cottrell, chairman of Taunton Cider and a former managing director of 
Courage. The purchase of 372 pubs from Bass was funded by by ANZ Banking Group and 
County NatWest Ventures; Independent, 10
th
 September, 1991. 
72
 Times, April 24, 1997 
73
 Consideration was 51.3m plus 10.2m of debt. Financial Post (Toronto, Canada) 22
nd
 May, 
1996, 
74
 Times, April 24, 1997; Discovery was formed as a result of a management buy-out from 
Whitbread in 1992 led by the chairman, Paul Smith. The Scotsman April 24, 1997, 
75
 Independent, 4
th
 February; Investors Chronicle, 6
th
 February, 1998. In October 1998 EI 
acquired Mayfair Taverns Limited and its estate of 276 pubs for £8.3m together with debt 
totalling £29.1m, a total consideration of £37.4 million. Earlier that year Mayfair’s estate had 
been valued at £39.2m. Nottingham Evening Post, 27
th
 October, 1997. June 2000 the 
acquisition of an estate of 183 pubs from Whitbread Plc’s Swallow pub estate for a total cash 
consideration of £118 million, 35 of the pubs acquired were subsequently sold for £50 
million (Times, 20
th
 June, 2000). 
76
 Independent, 30
th
 March, 1999. 
77
 These included June 1999 the acquisition of an estate of 217 pubs from Bass Holdings 
Limited and Bass Taverns Limited for a consideration of £69.2 million in June 1999 
(Independent, 11
th
 June, 1999), in May 2000, a £115m deal to buy 183 pubs, mostly in the 
North-East, Yorkshire and Lancashire, from Whitbread, and in July 2000, the Famous Pub 
Co and its chain of 20 outlets in the South East (Guardian, 25
th
 November 2000). 
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Confirmation of EIP as Britain’s largest landlord, see The Herald, 1
st
 December 2004. See 
also table 1. 
78
 Competition Commission. Interbrew SA and Bass Plc., pp.92-93. Scottish Courage was the 
brewing division of S&N. 
79
 The Scotsman, 19
th
 June, 1999. 
80
 Euroweek, 22 June, 2001. 
81
 European Venture Capital Journal, 1
st
 April, 2002. 
82
 Euroweek, 17
th
 May, 2002; Daily Deal, New York, 21 June, 2002; European Venture 
Capital Journal, 1 February, 2004. 2002/03 HC 906 Office of Fair Trading. Annual report 
and resource accounts 2002-03, p.66. Enterprise Inns plc, Annual Report, 2004, p.4. 
83
 Industry financial variables were constructed using all available data from firms in the 
brewing and malting industry group (Group 231) in the DTI/Cambridge Companies 
Database, 1949-1984 and Datastream 1984-2004 using corresponding INDC codes. 
Companies with insufficient data, and not explicitly engaged in brewing or pub estate 
management, or with data for only short periods (<10 years) were excluded, resulting in a 
sample of 23 firms with 828 firm/years observations. 
84
 Mason and McNally, ‘Market change’, p.414 
85
 Calculated from Office of National Statistics data, Retail Price Index, CZCI beer – off sales 
and CZCH – beer on sales. 
86
 With regard to property asset valuations and depreciation, the major change in the period 
was the introduction of Financial Reporting Standard 15, Tangible Fixed Assets in 1999, 
which recognised the increasing practice of not depreciating pub estate assets on the grounds 
that they were regularly maintained, thereby raising the economic life and residual value. 
87
 Calculated from EIP, Annual Reports, 1996-2004. 
88
 Calculated from Datastream. 
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89
 The proportion of operating cash flow used to service interest payments was always over 
50% throughout the period 1996-2004 and rose steadily such that by 2004 interest payments 
were £181m compared to operating cash flow of 208.6m (86.7%). Calculated from 
Datastream. 
90
 In the same period UK base rates fell from 13.38% in 1991 to 4.75% in 2004 (Bank of 
England, Interactive database; http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/boeapps/iadb/repo.asp). 
91
 Calculated from Datastream. 
92
 To the extent that such contingencies might crystallise, there were further contingent 
liabilities. These were not accrued in the EIP accounts, but should be borne in mind when 
interpreting return to capital measures.  
93
 Disputes about the equity of rents were the subject of protracted legal proceedings. For 
example the leading case: Inntrepreneur v Crehan [2006] UKHL 38. 
94
 EIP stated, ‘The flexibility of Enterprise agreements enables licensees to determine the 
balance between “fixed” costs such as rent and variable costs (beer prices) in their lease or 
tenancy. TISC, Pub Companies, Q. 134, s.3.3; Q. 143, s.3.3. 
95
 TISC, Pub companies Q. 148, Annex 4. Scenarios 2 and 4 exclude the effects of games 
machine income and show only the trade off between dry and wet rents. 
96
 The base case is abstracted for the purposes of comparing key variables and ignores 
additional factors such as additional upfront costs and quantity discounts available to groups 
of free houses. 
97
 TISC, Pub companies Q.201; Q.206, exhibit 7 showed EIP tenants yielding between 7.0% 
and 7.5% 
98
 ‘The Pubcos keep marching on and on and on and pushing the margins higher and higher 
and higher. They keep getting bigger and bigger discounts from the brewers, from the 
manufacturers, and never pass those on to the tenants.  If they pass them on in any way, shape 
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or form, even in the smallest form…they go and whack a huge chunk onto the rent’, TISC 
Pub companies Q. A.B Jacobs, HC 128, Q. 136.  
99
 Risk is fairly priced if, consistent with capital market theory, there is a linear relationship 
between return and its volatility.  
100
 The new lease was unusual compared to industry norms, which more typically offered 20-
year leases assignable after 5 or 10 years with similar duration rent reviews. We are grateful 
to a reviewer for assistance on this point. 
101
 The witness stated that ‘my rent showed against turnover 17.62% of my turnover’ (sic) 
and in written evidence that rent averages 12% of turnover (TISC Pub companies, Newport, 
Q.44; Appendix 21). 
102
 TISC, Pub companies, Newport, QQ, 22, 32, 41, 43. 
103
TISC, Pub companies, C 128, Newport, QQ, 44, HC 128 Trade and Industry Select 
Committee: Pub companies (Pubcos) Q.148, Annex 4; EIP Annual Report and Accounts, 
Interim results, 2004. 
104
 TISC, Pub companies, HC 128, Tuppen, Q.339. 
105
 TISC, Pub companies, HC 128, Tuppen, Q.339-341; 345 
106
 TISC, Business and Enterprise Committee (hereafter BEC), Pub companies, B&E 7
th
 
Report, Q. Tuppen, Q.213. 
107
  BEC, Pub companies, Tuppen, QQ.215, 216. 
108
 TISC, Pub companies, Q. 304, appendix 28; Memorandum by Wolverhampton & Dudley 
109
 TISC, Pub companies, Q. 231, appendix 21; Memorandum by Linda Newport 
110
 ‘We just had to leave our pub, in debt, after almost five years of hard slog getting 
nowhere, due in significant part, to the crippling nature of the pub-co tenant relationship…’ 
TISC Pub companies, HC 128, Q. s.8.4. 
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Table 1: Changes in the ownership of pubs by leading companies, 1989 and 2004 (1) 
             
1970    1989    2004 
             
Firm  No. of pubs  Firm  No. of pubs Firm  No. of pubs 
 
Bass Charr. 9450  Bass  7190  Enterprise (P)  9093 
Allied  8250  Allied  6678  Punch (P)  7400 
Whitbread 8280  Whitbread 6483  Spirit (P)  2470 
Grand Met.
2
 6135  Grand Met. 6419  Mitchells  2077 
        & Butler (P) 
Courage 6000  Courage 5002  Greene King  1684 
S & N
3
  1700  S & N  2287  Wolverhampton 1605 
        & Dudley  
        Innspired (P)  1066 
        Wellington (P) 835 
        Avebury (P)  750 
 
Total:  39,815    34,059     28,099 
             
Sources: 1970 from Gourvish and Wilson, The British Brewing Industry, Table 11.7, p.472; DTI Pub Cos 
Report Ev 243: Fig 3. 
Notes:    1.The figures reported above refer to the total number of pubs owned by the leading companies.   
 2.Grand Metropolitan (Grand Met) acquired Watney Mann in 1972. 
 3. S & N refers to Scottish & Newcastle.   
(P) indicates Pubco  
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Table 2: Enterprise Inns: Major Purchases and Acquisitions, 1991 – 2004 
 
Year Cumulative 
Total No. 
of 0utlets 
Pub purchases and Major Acquisitions  Deal 
Value 
£m 
Financing Method 
1991 372 09/09/1991 Enterprise Inns, backed by 
County NatWest Ventures, acquired 372 
pubs from Bass Plc. 
60.0 Venture capital 
1994 462 05/04/1994 100 pubs, mostly from Allied-
Lyons disposals 
15.0 Bank syndicate led by Samuel Montagu. 
1996 905 30/04/1996 39 pubs acquired from 
Whitbread PLC 
3.0 Cash 
07/06/1996 Acquisition of John Labatt (UK) 
(JL) from John Labatt, a unit of Interbrew 
Belgium, 
61.5 £43m debt and a one-for-six rights issue at 
163p a share. 
1997 1224 12/05/1997 Acquisition of Discovery Inns 46.2 3 for 8 rights issue. 
04/09/1997. Acquired eight pubs from 
Pubmaster 
1.6 Cash 
04/09/1997 Acquired 94 pubs from 
Whitbread 
9.4 Cash 
1998 1780 03/02/1998 Tender offer to acquire 25% 
ordinary share capital of Gibbs Mew 
(GM)20/05/1998 Tender offer to acquire 
75% ordinary share capital of Gibbs Mew 
12.4 
48.1 
Cash 
 
Share for share exchange. 
26/10/1998 Acquisition of Mayfair Taverns 37.4  £8.3m cash, assumption of £20.3m Mayfair 
debt and redemption of preference shares. 
1999 2430 04/05/1999 Tender offer to acquire 93.4% of 
Century Inns PLC 
73.8 Share for share exchange  
 
01/09/1999, Acquired 217 public houses 
from Bass PLC 
85  Cash offer and pub swap. 
2000 2580 08/06/2000 Acquired 187 pubs from 
Whitbread PLC 
115.0 Debt 
14/08/2000, Acquisition of the Famous Pub 
Co. 
3.8 Cash 
2001 3499 09/06/2001 Acquired 439 pubs from Morgan 
Grenfell Private Equity Ltd 
262.5  Cash  and debt  
05/07/2001 Agreement to acquire 431 
managed public houses from Scottish & 
Newcastle PLC 
269.5 £66 million right issue and debt 
2002 4189 24/05/2002 Acquisition of Laurel Pub Co 
Ltd from Morgan Grenfell Private Equity, a 
unit of Deutsche Bank AG, 
875.0 
£1.28 billion syndicated loan. Five tranches 
debt facility:  tranche 'A' £200m five-year 
revolving loam, tranche 'B' £400m five year 
term loan. Tranche 'C1' £200m facility  
maturing March 31 2003,  tranche 'C2'  
£200m  maturing on March 31 2004. £280m 
short term bridge loan to a rights issue 
underwritten by Deutsche Bank 
2004 8727 31/03/2004 Exercised call option to acquire 
the remaining 83.2% interest in Unique Pub 
Holding Co Ltd (UP) 
609.0 New share issue plus debt.  
Sources:  Thomson One Banker Deal Database and Nexis 
Page 47 of 52
URL: http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/fbsh
Business History
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review Only
 2
 
Table 3: Licensee profits, risk and return by agreement type 
Licensee agreement type 
(1) (2) (3) 
 
Free 
House 
High wet 
rent 
High dry 
rent 
a) Summary profit and loss account £'000 £'000 £'000 
Turnover
1
 212.1 212.1 212.1 
Cost of sales
2
 83.1 99.9 81.9 
Gross margin 129 112.2 130.2 
Wages and overhead
1
 59.4 59.4 59.4 
Profit before appropriations 69.6 52.8 70.8 
Rent
3
 14 32 
Interest payable
4
 14.5 
Licensee profit 55.1 38.8 38.8 
    
b) Profitability ratios 
   Pub value
1
 500 500 500 
Leverage
5
 1.263 1.361 1.825 
Cost of capital%
6
 8.921 9.263 10.887 
Return on capital (gross) %
7
 13.918 10.558 14.158 
Return on capital (net) %
7
 11.020 7.760 7.760 
    Notes: 
Agreement type (1) is an artificial ‘base case’ created for the purposes of strict comparison 
using limited parameters. Agreement types (2) and (3) correspond to the cases given in 
evidence by Enterprise Inns, excluding further complicating factors such as machine income 
sharing agreements.  
1. Turnover and overhead costs calculated by adjusting values from EIP accounts pro rata to 
pub value assumed in TIC ev 148, Annex 4. Pub value and turnover standardised at 
£500,000 and £212,100 in all three scenarios. 
2. Cost of sales adjusted according to variations in wet rents, per TIC ev 148, Annex 4, 
scenarios 2 and 4. Free house equivalent calculated by subtracting £16.8k discounts 
foregone (standard wet rent in tenanted houses) 
3. Rent charges after crediting £8k domestic accommodation allowance. 
4. Interest charges computed by applying interest rate (4.5%, Rf) to pub value and 
subtracting £8k domestic accommodation allowance. Average base interest rate 2004 = 
4.5% (Bank of England http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/boeapps/iadb/repo.asp). 
5. Leverage (L) defined as: ∆ licensee profit/∆ turnover, assuming all revenues and costs are 
variable, except rent/interest which are fixed 
6. Cost of capital defined as: Rf + (L x Rp), where Rp is the long run equity premium on the 
UK stock market. 
7. Return on capital defined as:  (Gross) Profit before appropriations divided by pub value; 
(Net) Licensee profit divided by pub value 
 
Sources: Enterprise Inns interim results, 2004; 004/05 HC 128 Trade and Industry Select 
Committee: Pub companies (Pubcos) ev 148, Annex 4. 
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Table 4: Comparative profitability 1986 and 2004 
 
 
2004 2004 2004 1986 1986 1986 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Free 
House 
High wet 
rent 
 High 
dry rent 
Free 
House Managed Managed 
 
Mark up 
adj 
 
£'000 £'000 £'000 £'000 £'000 £'000 
Turnover 212.1 212.1 212.1 205.4 205.4 205.4 
Profit before 
appropriations/contributio
n 69.6 52.8 70.8 20.9 39.4 60.0 
Machine income 8.8 8.8 8.8 
Rent 14.0 32.0 24.1 24.1 
Interest payable 14.5 22.5 
Licensee/pub profit 55.1 38.8 38.8 7.2 24.1 44.7 
Pub value  500.0 500.0 500.0 268.3 268.3 268.3 
       Return on capital gross 13.918 10.560 14.158 7.801 14.700 22.378 
Return on capital net 11.018 7.760 7.758 2.681 8.979 16.658 
 
 
 
 Notes: Columns 1-3 derived from scenarios listed in annex 4, TISC, ev.148; columns 4-6 
derived from data for national brewers using MMC 651, 1988/89, appendix 3.7, table 1, 
p.416; table 3, p.428; appendix 3.5, table 1, p.408. Free house cases (columns 1 and 4) 
constructed using comparable data, adjusted pro-rata to capital values cited for tenanted 
houses. Column 6 adjusts column 5 using the mark up calculation in MMC 651, 1988/89, 
table 3, p.428 to show the profit the pub would have earned without the inflation of transfer 
price by the brewery. 
1. Machine income was netted off rent in (2) and (3) in the 2004 calculations and for 
consistency is included calculation of net income for 1986. 
2. 4.5% (2004) and 10.0% (1986) (Bank of England 
http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/boeapps/iadb/repo.asp) in both cases after subtracting 
the assumed value of the benefit of domestic accommodation. 
3. Profit before appropriations/contribution divided by pub value. 
4. Licensee/pub profit divided by pub value 
 
 
 Sources: Enterprise Inns interim results, 2004; 004/05 HC 128 Trade and Industry Select 
Committee: Pub companies (Pubcos) ev 148, Annex 4. MMC 651, 1988/89, appendix 3.7, 
table 1, p.416; table 3, p.428; appendix 3.5, table 1, p.408. 
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Table 5: Licensee profits and ownership 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 
Enterprise 
Inns 
Wolver-
hampton and 
Dudley 
 Average 
tenanted pub 
a) Summary profit and loss account £'000 £'000 £'000 
Turnover 212.1 212.1 212.1 
Cost of sales 99.9 * 114.4 
Gross margin 112.2 * 97.7 
Wages and overhead 59.4 * 39.8 
Profit before appropriations 52.8 59.0 57.9 
Rent 14.0 24.0 20.4 
Licensee profit 38.8 35.0 37.5 
    
b) Profitability ratios    
Pub value
1
 500 500 500 
    
Gross return on capital 10.560 11.800 11.584 
Net return on capital 7.760 7.000 7.505 
  
 
Notes:  
* no data. Assumptions as Table 2. 
 
Sources: (1) as Table 2; (2) HC 128 Trade and Industry Select Committee: Pub companies 
(Pubcos) ev 304, appendix 28; Memorandum by the Wolverhampton & Dudley Breweries 
PLC (3)  HC 128 Trade and Industry Select Committee: Pub companies (Pubcos) ev 204, 
Exhibit 8; Profit & Loss account of an Average Tenanted Pub, Morgan Stanley report. 
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Sources: Calculated from Cambridge University Companies Database and Datastream. 
Note: Return of capital employed is defined as profit before interest and tax divided by long 
term debt and equity capital. 
 
 
 
Source: Datastream 
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Figure 1: Beer Industry, Return on Capital 
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Figure 2: Return on capital, Beer Industry and 
Enterprise Inns
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Source: Calculated from Datastream 
 
 
Source: Calculated from Datastream. 
Note: Total return is calculated as the difference in share price plus dividend indexed to 100 
for the first day of EIP trading, 3
rd
 November 1995. 
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Figure 3: Debt/Equity ratio, Beer Industry and 
Enterprise Inns
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Figure 4: Total shareholder return, EIP and 
London Stock exchange
Enterprise FTSE all share index
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